Testimony of

Mr. David Clendaniel
President and CEO of Dover Federal Credit Union

On behalf of
The National Association of Federal Credit Unions

“Examining Regulatory Relief Proposals for Community Financial Institutions Part II”

Before the
United States House Financial Services Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee

United States House of Representatives

July 15, 2014
Introduction

Good afternoon Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Meeks and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is David Clendaniel and I am testifying today on behalf of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions (NAFCU). I am happy to be appearing before the subcommittee today to talk about regulatory relief. I look forward to providing feedback on the specific legislation you are considering, in addition to giving a general overview of the current regulatory environment and the most timely issues credit unions like mine face.

I have served as the President and CEO of Dover Federal Credit Union in Dover, Delaware since 1997. Holding degrees from both the University of Delaware and Delaware State University, I have spent over thirty years in the financial services industry. I have been with Dover FCU in a number of executive positions for over twenty years. Dover Federal Credit Union was first chartered in 1958 by a handful of Air Force and civilian workers at Dover Air Force Base. Today we serve over 39,000 members with assets exceeding $400 million.

As you know, NAFCU is the only national organization exclusively representing the interests of the nation’s federally-chartered credit unions. NAFCU-member credit unions collectively account for approximately 69 percent of the assets of all federally chartered credit unions. NAFCU and the entire credit union community appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing regarding legislative proposals designed to help our nation’s financial institutions better serve the American public.

I. Increased Regulatory Burden has Impacted Credit Unions

Credit unions have a long track record of helping the economy and making loans when other lenders often have left various markets. This was evidenced during the recent financial crisis when credit unions kept making auto loans, home loans, and small business loans when other lenders cut back. Still, credit unions have always been some of the most highly regulated of all financial institutions, facing restrictions on who they can serve and their ability to raise capital.
Credit unions continue to play a crucial role in the recovery of our nation's economy. Credit unions remain a relatively small part of the marketplace when compared to the banking industry. They are oftentimes a lender of last resort for consumers that have been denied credit via other financial institutions. As detailed in the chart below, on average from 2005-2013, credit unions consistently outperformed banks with lower interest rates on loans and higher returns on savings and deposits.

![Interest rate differences, credit unions vs. banks](chart)

Today, credit union lending continues to grow at a solid pace, up about 14% in March compared to 2009. In short, credit unions didn't cause the financial crisis, helped blunt the crisis by continuing to lend during difficult times, and perhaps most importantly, continue to play a key role in the still fragile economic recovery. Although credit unions continue to focus on their members, the increasing complexity of the regulatory environment is taking a toll on the credit union industry. While NAFCU and its member credit unions take safety and soundness extremely seriously, the regulatory pendulum post-crisis has swung too far towards an environment of overregulation that threatens to stifle economic growth. As the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) work to prevent the next financial crisis, even the most well intended regulations have the potential to regulate our industry out of business.
During the consideration of financial reform, NAFCU was concerned about the possibility of overregulation of good actors such as credit unions, and this was why NAFCU was the only credit union trade association to oppose the CFPB having rulemaking authority over credit unions. Unfortunately, many of our concerns, about the increased regulatory burdens that credit unions would face under the CFPB, have proven true. While there are credible arguments to be made for the existence of a CFPB, its primary focus should be on regulating the unregulated bad actors, not adding new regulatory burdens to good actors like credit unions that already fall under a functional regulator. As expected, the breadth and pace of CFPB rulemaking is troublesome, and the unprecedented new compliance burden placed on credit unions has been immense.

The impact of this growing compliance burden is evident as the number of financial institutions continues to decline, dropping by 19.9% (more than 1,600) institutions since 2007. This trend rings true for credit unions as well, and a main reason for the decline is the increasing cost and complexity of complying with the ever-increasing onslaught of regulations. Many smaller institutions simply cannot keep up with the new regulatory tide and have to merge out of business or be taken over.

This growing demand on credit unions is demonstrated by a 2011 NAFCU survey of our membership that found that nearly 97% of respondents were spending more time on regulatory compliance issues than they did in 2009. A 2012 NAFCU survey of our membership found that 94% of respondents had seen their compliance burdens increase since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. Furthermore, a March of 2013 survey of NAFCU members found that nearly 27% had increased their full-time equivalents (FTEs) for compliance personnel in 2013, as compared to 2012. That same survey found that over 70% of respondents have had non-compliance staff members take on compliance-related duties due to the increasing regulatory burden. This highlights the fact that many non-compliance staff are being forced to take time away from serving members to spend time on compliance issues. Furthermore, a number of credit unions have also turned to outside vendors to help them with compliance issues – a survey of NAFCU members, conducted in June of 2014, found that nearly 80% of respondents are using third-party vendors to help comply with the new TILA-RESPA requirements from the CFPB.
At Dover FCU our current annual expenditure on compliance is over $250,000, compared with about $80,000 that we spent in 2009 before the Dodd-Frank Act. While increased costs for compliance related expenses over time are normal, this spike is directly correlated to the regulations being promulgated by the CFPB as mandated in Dodd-Frank. As described above, Dover is also in the unfortunate circumstance of non-compliance staff being pulled off their normal duties out of necessity to work on compliance related issues. As a result of this stress on our key staff, we are in the process of hiring another compliance officer bringing our total compliance expenditure well above $300,000 annually. It should be noted that this figure does not include staff training to comply with various regulations which totals nearly 3,000 personnel hours or another $57,000 annually.

II. NCUA’s Risk-Based Capital Proposal: Regulating Credit Unions Out of Existence

Before commenting on the legislation before us today, I would like to update the committee on NCUA’s risk-based capital proposal for credit unions and what impact this rule will have on the credit union industry if it becomes final without significant changes. As members of the subcommittee are aware, this ongoing issue is of the utmost importance to credit unions of all sizes and the one-size-fits-all approach currently being taken by NCUA will stifle growth, innovation and diversification at credit unions.

NAFCU’s Economics and Research department prepared the impact analysis graph found below that outline the impact the proposal would have on credit unions based on their asset size. Our analysis of the proposed rule determined that credit unions with more than $50 million in assets will have to hold $7.1 billion more in additional reserves to achieve the same capital cushion levels that they currently maintain. While NCUA contends that a lower amount of capital is actually needed for impacted credit unions to remain at a well-capitalized level, the agency is ignoring the fact that most credit unions seek to maintain a capital cushion above the minimum needed for that level – often because NCUA’s own examiners have encouraged them to do so. Because credit unions cannot raise capital from the open market like other financial institutions, this cost of maintaining a cushion will undoubtedly be passed on to the 97 million credit union
members across the country. A survey of NAFCU’s membership found that nearly 60% of respondents believe the proposed rule would force their credit union to hold more capital, while nearly 65% believe this proposal would force them to realign their balance sheet. Simply put, if the NCUA implements this rule as proposed, credit unions will have less capital to loan to credit worthy borrowers, whether for a mortgage, auto, or business loan.

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**Change in capital cushion by asset class**

Between current rule (NWR) and proposed rule (RBNW)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset Class</th>
<th>Change in Capital Cushion (in Millions)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$50M</td>
<td>-$234</td>
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<tr>
<td>$50M-$100M</td>
<td>-$698</td>
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<tr>
<td>$100M-$250M</td>
<td>$1,158</td>
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<tr>
<td>$250M-$500M</td>
<td>-$1,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>$500M-$1B</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$1B+</td>
<td>-$3,568</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (&gt; $50M)</td>
<td>$7,057</td>
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Additionally, it is also worth drawing the subcommittee’s attention to the chart below breaking-down risk-weighting at the FDIC (under Basel III) compared to the proposed risk-weighting by NCUA highlighting the areas that will be especially problematic for our nation’s credit unions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>NCUA proposal</th>
<th>FDIC weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numerator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contra Assets</td>
<td>Goodwill</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifiable intangible assets</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCUSIF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Investments*</td>
<td>0-1 Year</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-3 Years</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5 Years</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-10 Years</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;10 Years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corporate CU Member Capital</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corporate Paid-in Capital</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Loans</td>
<td>Nondelinquent 1st mort R/E loans (excl. MBLs)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;25% of assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-35% of Assets</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;35% of Assets</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other R/E and delinquent R/E</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;10% of Assets</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>10-20% of Assets</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;20% of Assets</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denominator</td>
<td>Nondelinquent student loans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Loans</td>
<td>Nondelinquent other loans</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delinquent other loans</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SBA</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member business loans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;15% of Assets</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15-25% of Assets</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;25% of Assets</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Assets</td>
<td>Goodwill</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Inv't in CUSO</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mort servicing rights</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All other assets</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Bal Sheet</td>
<td>Loans with recourse</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfunded commitments bus loans (75% conversion)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfunded commitments non-bus loans (10% conversion)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalization thresholds</td>
<td>Well Capitalized</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adequately Capitalized</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* U.S. Treasuries and other direct and unconditional claims on the U.S. government are weighted at zero by both NCUA and FDIC. Most other credit union investments are weighted from 0.2 to 2 according to their maturity. They would generally be rated at a constant 0.2 under the FDIC rule.

** No direct comparison with FDIC
Widespread concern about this proposal is also highlighted by the over 2,000 comment letters NCUA has received to date about the content of the proposal and the process used to fast track the rule despite credit unions not contributing to the financial crisis. In NAFCU’s own comment letter submitted on May 27, 2014, (attachment A) signed by the entire NAFCU Board of Directors and most Regulatory Committee members, significant concerns about the proposal included:

- Several issues related to NCUA’s legal authority to issue the rule as proposed, such as:
  - Comparability with banking regulatory requirements;
  - Substitution of statutorily defined legal terms;
  - Individual minimum capital requirements;
  - Definition of a “complex” credit union;
- The need for a legislative solution in order to achieve a fair and balanced risk-based capital system;
- NCUA’s treatment of the regulatory process including the refusal to extend the comment period and form an industry working group prior to releasing a proposed rule, and the need for an additional notice of proposed rulemaking with public comment period;
- NCUA’s drastic understatement of credit unions that will be affected by this rule and whose balance sheets and business plans will need adjustment;
- NCUA’s proposed risk-based capital ratio for well capitalized credit unions set at 10.5 percent;
- NCUA’s treatment of risk-weighted assets and the lack of explanation for deviation from similar banking risk-weights;
- NCUA’s incorporation of interest rate and concentration risk into risk-weighting for real estate, investments, and member business loans (MBL’s);
- Individual minimum capital requirements for credit unions including issues with the subjectivity of their imposition;
- Components not included in the numerator portion of the risk-based capital ratio, such as goodwill;
• The 1.25 percent cap on Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL) especially considering the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) most recent proposal on ALLL;

• Supplemental capital authority is needed now more than ever considering the restrictions brought on by this rule; and

• The proposed 18-month implementation timetable is not long enough for a rule as complex and impactful as this proposed rule.

Many of these concerns were also expressed by Dover FCU in our own comment letter (attachment B) and by Representatives Pete King (R-NY) and ranking member Gregory Meeks (D-NY) in a bipartisan joint letter sent to NCUA that garnered the support of 324 of their House colleagues. Chairman Hensarling, Chairman Capito, Chairman McHenry and numerous other Members of the Financial Services Committee also weighed in with NCUA. On behalf of NAFCU member credit unions and the entire credit union community, we want to thank all of you for your steadfast support. The outpouring of concern from Congress has been significant and NAFCU remains hopeful that a final rule will reflect many of the issues raised.

Despite NCUA’s refusal to extend the official comment period, the recent listening sessions on the proposal in Los Angeles, California, and Chicago, Illinois, reinforce the need for significant changes to the proposal and additional time for credit unions to digest the proposal and come into compliance. During these listening sessions, credit unions have repeatedly stated that they believe that, given the magnitude of this rule and its potentially devastating effects on our member credit unions, it is imperative that NCUA re-propose the rule.

As many of you are aware, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) not only mandates consideration of all submitted comments, but it also requires an agency to engage in a subsequent comment period when the agency makes such substantive changes to a rule that it is no longer a logical outgrowth of the proposal. If NCUA implements changes to the proposed rule in accordance with even some of the 2,000 comments received, the changes will be substantive and more than mere adjustments or clarifications to the initial proposal. In fact, both NCUA Chairman Debbie Matz and Board Member Rick Metsger have publically supported changing
the treatment of risk-weighted assets. NAFCU believes that this change alone would qualify as "substantive" under the APA and warrant reissuing the proposal for public comment.

Furthermore, NAFCU encourages NCUA to allow credit unions the opportunity to voice their thoughts and concerns. The 2,000 comments submitted for the proposal clearly exemplify that credit unions around the country have a vested interest in this issue and they deserve the opportunity to comment given the magnitude of the potential negative impact of this proposal. Credit unions believe it is critical that NCUA effectively consider and incorporate industry input to ensure that an appropriate risk-based capital regime is adopted for the credit union industry. In the best interests of all stakeholders, therefore, credit unions urge the NCUA Board to operate in a collaborative manner with the credit union industry and reissue the risk-based capital proposal for comment so that we may have the necessary opportunity to raise their concerns and suggestions.

Should NCUA's proposal go forward with little or no changes, the new rule would precipitate the need for Congressional action on proposals to bring about capital changes for credit unions such as H.R. 719, the Capital Access for Small Businesses and Jobs Act, which would allow credit unions to have access to supplemental capital sources. In addition this would prompt the need for statutory changes necessary to design a true risk-based capital system for credit unions. Lastly, a final rule mirroring the proposal in terms of an individual credit union's risk-based capital requirements being changed through the exam process only reinforces the need for action on H.R. 1553, the Financial Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act. NAFCU looks forward to continuing to work with Congress on this timely issue.

III. NAFCU on Regulatory Burden: Legislative and Regulatory Action Needed

Finding ways to cut-down on burdensome and unnecessary regulatory compliance costs is the only way for credit unions to thrive and continue to provide their member-owners with basic
financial services and the exemplary service they need and deserve. It is also a top goal of NAFCU.

Ongoing discussions with NAFCU member credit unions led to the unveiling of NAFCU’s “Five Point Plan for Regulatory Relief” (attachment C) in February of 2013, and a call for Congress to enact meaningful legislative reforms that would provide much needed assistance to our nation’s credit unions. The “Five Point Plan” covers key areas for credit unions including: Administrative Improvements for the Powers of NCUA; Capital Reforms for Credit Unions; Structural Improvements for Credit Unions; Operational Improvements for Credit Unions; and, 21st Century Standards for Data Security.

Recognizing that there are a number of outdated regulations and requirements that no longer make sense and need to be modernized or eliminated, NAFCU also compiled and released a document entitled “NAFCU’S Dirty Dozen” (attachment D) in December of 2013, that outlines twelve key regulatory issues credit unions face that should be eliminated or amended. The “Dirty Dozen” includes expanding credit union investment authority; updating NCUA’s fixed assets rules; improving the process for credit unions seeking changes to their field of membership; increasing the number of transactions allowed to be made per month from savings accounts per the Federal Reserve Regulation D; providing flexibility for credit unions that offer member business loans; updating requirements to disclose account numbers to protect privacy of credit union members; updating advertisement requirements for loans products and share accounts; modernizing NCUA advertising requirements; making improvements to the Central Liquidity Fund; providing flexibility for federal credit unions to operate under state law in certain circumstances; simplifying regulations governing check processing and funds availability; and, eliminating redundant NCUA requirements to provide copies of appraisals upon request.

Our “Five Point Plan” and “Dirty Dozen” outline a number of areas where credit unions need action and we urge the Committee to review these documents. In our statement today, we highlight a number of key issues where regulatory burdens and proposals are posing immediate threats to the ability of credit unions to serve their members and give them the financial products that they want.
IV. Legislative Measures before the Subcommittee Today

NAFCU is pleased to participate in today’s subcommittee hearing and comment on several of the proposals being reviewed as they relate to and impact our nation’s credit unions. We appreciate the leadership of the Committee in bringing these measures forward and would urge action on these efforts at relief.

**Community Bank Mortgage Servicing Asset Capital Requirements Study Act (H.R. 4042)**

First and foremost, NAFCU has reviewed the bipartisan *Community Bank Mortgage Servicing Asset Capital Requirements Study Act* (H.R.4042) introduced by Reps. Luetkemeyer and Perlmutter that would delay the implementation of Basel III regulations on mortgage servicing assets until an impact study is conducted and alternatives are explored. Given the circumstances credit unions find themselves in with the risk-based capital proposal described in the first half of my testimony, NAFCU believes this is an appropriate vehicle to include a similar analysis be done by NCUA pertaining to their proposal.

In fact, members of Congress have asked NCUA for additional information about how the risk-weights for various asset classes were derived and there has been no explanation to date. It is also worth noting that the *Federal Credit Union Act* requires that the system of prompt corrective action NCUA prescribes by regulation be comparable to those that the banking regulators institute. In the many iterations of Basel and most recent rules that the FDIC has finalized, banking regulators have chosen not to incorporate interest rate and concentration risk into their risk-weights. However, NCUA’s proposal incorporates both. While interest rate risk and concentration risk need to be managed and planned for at every credit union, the draconian proposal in question is not the way to avoid future losses.

Again, a thorough study of NCUA’s proposal is appropriate and, quite frankly, should have been done from the outset. NAFCU would support suspending NCUA action on the risk-based capital proposal until such a study is done, delivered to Congress, and reviewed by lawmakers and the public.
SAFE Act Confidentiality and Privilege Enhancement Act (H.R. 4626)

NAFCU supports legislation introduced by Chairman Capito that would clarify the confidentiality of information shared between state and federal financial service regulators under the S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act. This commonsense technical fix is welcomed by credit unions as it applies to the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System & Registry established as an oversight mechanism to collect information from Mortgage Loan Originators.

American Savings Promotion Act (H.R. 3374)

NAFCU supports this bipartisan legislation introduced by Representatives Cotton and Kilmer that would amend federal law to allow credit unions and other financial institutions to use savings promotion raffle products. As members of the committee may be aware, several states have passed laws to allow credit unions to offer these prize-linked savings accounts where members are incentivized to save through being entered into a lottery or raffle. Those credit unions that have instituted such programs have found them to be successful tools. As the country recovers from the worst financial crisis of our time, creative programs with clear rules and guidelines that encourage household savings merit serious consideration.

End Operation Choke Point Act (H.R. 4986)

While NAFCU understands the importance of the government’s role in fighting fraud and taking enforcement action where appropriate, our member credit unions remain concerned about the aggressive nature of the Justice Department’s “Operation Choke Point” program. As members of the subcommittee are aware, this initiative investigates financial institutions, including credit unions, that provide banking services to certain types of businesses that are subject to greater instances of fraud. While preventing fraud is a laudable concern, this approach is putting unnecessary onus on credit unions to police activities of legal third parties. The mere prospect of an enforcement action is sufficient cause for some financial institutions to restrict access to their payments systems to only well established companies. Not only does this cause an unnecessary level of angst for the financial institutions, if left unchecked it could seriously deter future growth and innovation.
For these reasons NAFCU supports Representative Luetkemeyer’s legislation, the *End Operation Choke Point Act* (H.R. 4986), that would create a legal safe harbor for financial institutions, including credit unions, that meet qualifying criteria. For a financial institution to meet such criteria the merchant would have to be licensed to offer the product or service it's selling; be registered as a money transmitting business; or provide a legal opinion that demonstrates the legality of its business operations.

**The Regulation D Study Act (H.R. 3240)**

NAFCU supports this bipartisan legislation introduced by Representatives Pittenger and Maloney that would mandate the Government Accountability Office to study the impact of the Federal Reserve Board's monetary reserve requirements on depository institutions, consumers and monetary policy.

As you are aware, Regulation D limits a credit union member’s ability to transfer their money between savings and checking accounts to six transactions per month. Once a transaction is made beyond that limit, a member is either charged a fee or has their savings account is reclassified as a “transaction account”. Under current Regulation D rules, savings accounts are not subject to reserve requirements, while transaction accounts are. This discrepancy tends to be confusing for credit union members and often forces credit union employees to focus their attention on the compliance issue rather than customer service.

Federal Reserve Regulation D is a prime example of a regulation that hasn’t been reconsidered by Congress or the agencies in far too long and that is why it was included on the aforementioned NAFCU’s “Dirty Dozen” list. NAFCU believes a study of whether this outdated monetary reserve requirements imposed on depository institutions and consumers are necessary would result in strong evidence for the regulation’s full repeal.

**Rep. Luetkemeyer’s Discussion Draft related to Appraiser Requirements under TILA**

NAFCU supports the intent in Rep. Luetkemeyer’s discussion draft that would exempt higher-risk mortgages of $250,000 or less from appraisal requirement provisions under the *Truth in Lending Act* if the lender holds the loan in portfolio for at least 3 years. As the committee
reviews this bill for potential changes, NAFCU would also support the $250k threshold being raised to a higher level. This bill would also provide important legal safeguards for lenders acting in good faith throughout the appraisal process.

H.R. 3913, Rep. Duffy’s bill to require certain considerations before issuing regulations
We support the concept of this legislation by Representative Duffy to amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to require agencies to make certain considerations relating to the promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation before issuing or modifying certain regulations. We would urge that parallel language to apply such a standard to the NCUA and the CFPB as appropriate be included should the legislation move forward.

V. Additional Areas Where Credit Unions Need Relief

In addition to the proposals to provide relief before the Subcommittee today and the areas outlined in NAFCU’s “Five-Point Plan for Regulatory Relief” and our “Dirty Dozen” regulations, I would like to bring to the Subcommittee’s attention a few additional measures that can help provide relief.

CFPB Reforms
We are pleased that the Financial Services Committee has already acted on a series of measures to improve the governance and transparency of the CFPB. One additional area that could use action are the arbitrary thresholds established under the Dodd-Frank Act. NAFCU believes that, at the very least, all credit unions, not just those under $10 billion, should be exempt from examination by the CFPB. Furthermore, the additional thresholds established in the Dodd-Frank Act should be raised and indexed. For example, the Act established $10 billion as an arbitrary threshold for financial institutions being subject to the Durbin interchange price cap. We believe that raising such a threshold would still accomplish the same objectives, while not penalizing the number of “good actors” that have found themselves above the arbitrary $10 billion line but below mega-bank status. At the very least, the $10 billion line should be indexed for inflation on an annual basis – going back retroactively to its establishment.
Other Approaches to Relief from the Credit Union MBL Cap

While NAFCU supports and urges action on H.R. 688, the *Credit Union Small Business Jobs Creation Act*, we would also urge Congressional action on the *Credit Union Residential Loan Parity Act*, H.R. 4226, which would exclude loans made non-owner occupied 1- to 4-family dwelling from the definition of a member business loan. Furthermore, we would urge support for H.R. 5061, legislation recently introduced by House Veterans Affairs Committee Chairman Jeff Miller (R-FL), to exempt loans made to our nation’s veterans from the definition of a member business loan. This measure can not only help our nation’s returning heroes, but also the American economy.

Examination Fairness

New examination fairness provisions should be enacted to help ensure timeliness, clear guidance and an independent appeal process free of examiner retaliation. As outlined earlier, NAFCU supports the bipartisan “*Financial Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act*” (H.R. 1553) introduced on April 15, 2013, by Chairman Capito and Representative Maloney and is hopeful that the issues this bill seeks to address are given consideration moving forward. Credit unions must have adequate notice of and proper guidance for exams, the right to appeal to an independent administrative law judge during the appeal process, and be assured that they are protected from examiner retaliation.

VI. Regulatory Coordination is More Important Than Ever

With numerous new rulemakings coming from regulators, coordination between the agencies is more important than ever. Congress should use its oversight authority to make sure that regulators are coordinating their efforts and not duplicating burdens on credit unions by working independently on changes to regulations that impact the same areas of service. There are a number of areas where opportunities for coordination exist and can be beneficial.

Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)

NAFCU has been on the forefront encouraging the FSOC regulators to fulfill their Dodd-Frank mandated duty to facilitate rule coordination. This duty includes facilitating information sharing
and coordination among the member agencies of domestic financial services policy development, rulemaking, examinations, reporting requirements and enforcement actions. Through this role, the FSOC is effectively charged with ameliorating weaknesses within the regulatory structure and promoting a safer and more stable system. It is extremely important to credit unions for our industry’s copious regulators to coordinate with each other to help mitigate regulatory burden. We urge Congress to exercise oversight in this regard and consider putting into statute parameters that would encourage the FSOC to fulfill this duty in a thorough and timely manner.

Data Security
Outside of advocating for federal legislation with regard to the safekeeping of information and breach notification requirements for our nation’s retailers, NAFCU has also urged regulatory coordination for credit unions already in compliance with the stringent standards in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. In the wake of the massive Target data breach in December of 2013, the Federal Trade Commission began exploring a range of regulatory options to assist consumers, businesses, and financial institutions. Moving forward, it is imperative that NCUA ensure that credit unions are protected from any unnecessary regulatory burden and continue to allow them to provide quality services to their members.

VII. Conclusion: The Need for Regulatory Relief and Congressional Oversight

The growing regulatory burden on credit unions is the top challenge facing the industry today. The number of credit unions continues to decline, as the compliance requirements in a post Dodd-Frank environment have grown to a tipping point where it is hard for many smaller institutions to survive. Credit unions want to continue to aid in the economic recovery, but are being stymied by overregulation. NAFCU appreciates the subcommittee’s work to review legislation that would provide relief for credit unions through commonsense and coordinated regulation and eliminating or amending outdated requirements.
Congress should also continue vigorous oversight of the federal financial agencies, including NCUA, and take action on this issues outline in this statement where they fail to take appropriate steps.

We thank you for the opportunity to share our thoughts with you today. I welcome any questions you might have.

**Attachment A**: NAFCU’s May 27, 2014, comment letter on the NCUA’s Prompt Corrective Action/ Risk-Based Capital proposal

**Attachment B**: Dover Federal Credit Union’s May 14, 2014, comment letter on the NCUA’s Prompt Corrective Action/ Risk-Based Capital proposal

**Attachment C**: NAFCU’s “Five Point Plan for Regulatory Relief” released in February 2013

**Attachment D**: NAFCU’s “Dirty Dozen” – Twelve Regulations to Eliminate or Amend
Attachment A: NAFCU’s May 27, 2014, comment letter on the NCUA’s Prompt Corrective Action/ Risk-Based Capital proposal
May 27, 2014

Gerard Poliquin
Secretary of the Board
National Credit Union Administration
1775 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314-3428

RE: Comments on NCUA Prompt Corrective Action – Risk-Based Capital Proposed Rule

Dear Mr. Poliquin:

On behalf of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions (NAFCU), the only trade association that exclusively represents federal credit unions, I am writing to you regarding the proposed rule on prompt corrective action and risk-based capital. As the credit union community comments on this rule, NAFCU is hopeful that the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA or Agency) Board will realize the devastating effect that this proposal will have on the credit union industry, the American consumer, and our nation’s small businesses. While we are supportive of the idea of a risk-based capital regime for credit unions, the current NCUA proposal is not appropriate for credit unions or the credit union industry. If it were to be implemented as proposed, credit unions would find themselves at a significant competitive disadvantage to banks. As proposed, the rule is one-size-fits-all and would serve to stifle growth, innovation, and diversification within credit unions. We ask that the NCUA Board withdraw the rule or alternatively make major modifications to the proposal before any rule is finalized.

NAFCU has many concerns with the proposed rule which we explain in detail below; however, our major concerns include:

- Several issues related to NCUA’s legal authority to issue the rule as proposed, such as:
  - Comparability with banking regulatory requirements;
  - Substitution of statutorily defined legal terms;
  - Individual minimum capital requirements;
  - Definition of a “complex” credit union;
- The need for a legislative solution in order to achieve a fair and balanced risk-based capital system;
- NCUA’s treatment of the regulatory process including the refusal to extend the comment period and form an industry working group prior to releasing a
proposed rule, and the need for an additional notice of proposed rulemaking with public comment period;

- NCUA’s drastic understatement of credit unions that will be affected by this rule and whose balance sheets and business plans will need adjustment;
- NCUA’s proposed risk-based capital ratio for well capitalized credit unions set at 10.5 percent;
- NCUA’s treatment of risk-weighted assets and the lack of explanation for deviation from similar banking risk-weights;
- NCUA’s incorporation of interest rate and concentration risk into risk-weighting for real estate, investments, and member business loans (MBL’s);
- Individual minimum capital requirements for credit unions including issues with the subjectivity of their imposition;
- Components not included in the numerator portion of the risk-based capital ratio, such as goodwill;
- The 1.25 percent cap on Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL) especially considering the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) most recent proposal on ALLL;
- Supplemental capital authority is needed now more than ever considering the restrictions brought on by this rule; and
- The proposed 18-month implementation timetable is not long enough for a rule as complex and impactful as this proposed rule.

**Legal Authority**

NAFCU does not believe that NCUA has the legal authority to issue the rule as proposed. There are several areas of the proposed rule where NAFCU questions whether the rule is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCU Act.)

**The FCU Act Requirements**

The FCU Act 12 U.S.C. §1790d contains the requirements for Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), including the required regulations and the risk-based net worth requirement. These provisions were added to the FCU Act by the Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 (CUMAA).

NCUA acknowledges in the proposed rule that it derives its legal authority for promulgating the proposed risk-based capital rule from sections 1766\(^1\) and 1790d of the FCU Act, and maintains that the proposed rule achieves the purposes that the FCU Act requires.

NCUA states in the proposed rule that “Congress set forth a basic structure for PCA in section 216 that consists of three principal components: (1) A framework combining mandatory actions prescribed by statute with discretionary actions developed by NCUA; (2) an alternative system of PCA to be developed by NCUA for credit unions defined as

\(^1\) This section refers to powers of the NCUA Board.
'new'; and (3) a risk-based net worth requirement to apply to credit unions that NCUA defines as 'complex.'

**Comparability**

The FCU Act requires that the NCUA Board “shall, by regulation, prescribe a system of prompt corrective action for insured credit unions that is—(i) consistent with this section; and (ii) comparable to section 1831o of this title.”²³ (Emphasis added.) This reference to 12 U.S.C. §1831o is to the PCA requirements of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as implemented through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulations.

During the deliberations on CUMAA, Congress also stated on the record that “‘Comparable’ here means parallel in substance (though not necessarily identical in detail) and equivalent in rigor.”⁴ This proposed rule goes far beyond this interpretation of comparable in a number of instances that are highlighted throughout this letter.

**Risk-Based Net Worth vs. Risk-Based Capital Terminology**

NCUA’s proposed amendments to 12 C.F.R. §702.102 would replace statutorily defined terms with what it considers to be “functionally equivalent” terms.⁵ NAFCU questions whether NCUA has the legal authority to deviate from these statutory terms. The FCU Act also requires a “risk based net worth requirement for complex credit unions;” the statutory requirement reads:

> “Risk-based net worth requirement for complex credit unions.—

(1) In general.—The regulations required under subsection (b)(1) of this section shall include a risk-based net worth requirement for insured credit unions that are complex, as defined by the Board based on the portfolios of assets and liabilities of credit unions.

(2) Standard.—The Board shall design the risk-based net worth requirement to take account of any material risks against which the net worth ratio required for an insured credit union to be adequately capitalized may not provide adequate protection.”⁶⁷ (Emphasis added.)

The FCU Act also provides specific definitions for “net worth”⁷ and “net worth ratio.”⁸ These terms are specifically defined in the FCU Act as follows:

> “(2) Net worth.—The term “net worth”

(4) with respect to any insured credit union, means the retained earnings balance of the credit union, as determined under generally accepted accounting principles, together with any amounts that were previously retained earnings of any other credit union with which the credit union has combined;

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(B) with respect to any insured credit union, includes, at the Board's discretion and subject to rules and regulations established by the Board, assistance provided under section 208 to facilitate a least-cost resolution consistent with the best interests of the credit union system; and
(C) with respect to a low-income credit union, includes secondary capital accounts that are—
(i) uninsured; and
(ii) subordinate to all other claims against the credit union, including the claims of creditors, shareholders, and the Fund.9

(3) Net worth ratio.
The term "net worth ratio" means, with respect to a credit union, the ratio of the net worth of the credit union to the total assets of the credit union."10 (Emphasis added.)

The preamble to the proposed rule discusses NCUA’s proposed amendments to § 702.102, including changes to the terminology used. NCUA acknowledges that the FCU Act specifically uses the term “risk-based net worth requirement” but proposes to replace that terminology with “risk-based capital,” which it contends is “functionally equivalent.”11

The proposed rule also replaces the term “net worth” with the term “capital categories” to describe the combined “net worth ratio” and “risk-based net worth” measurements, as well as several other modifications to the terminology currently used.

NCUA contends that “no substantive changes to the requirements of section 216(c) are intended by these changes in terminology.”12 These changes are not only substantive, but redefine statutorily defined terms including “net worth” and “net worth ratio” with terms that do not encompass the same things.

These statutorily defined terms may not be redefined by NCUA through regulation in order to place an ill-fitting risk-based capital system on top of the current PCA system. NAFCU believes that if NCUA really wants to institute a working risk-based capital system that would be comparable to what banks have, then NCUA would need Congress to change the FCU Act to give it the authority to do so.

**Individual Minimum Capital Requirements**

NAFCU questions whether NCUA has the statutory authority to institute individual minimum capital requirements. Under the proposed rule, NCUA introduces a new power to raise individual minimum capital requirements for credit unions “that varies from any of the risk-based capital requirement (s) that would otherwise apply to the credit union...”13 The proposed rule contains a list of circumstances where NCUA could raise a credit union’s individual minimum capital requirements that includes, among others, a credit union receiving special supervisory attention or a portfolio that reflects weak credit quality or significant likelihood of financial loss. The FCU Act 12 U.S.C. § 1790d(h) states:

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12 Id.
13 Prompt Corrective Action - Risk-Based Capital, 79 Fed. Reg. 11184, 11216 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 702.105(a)).
“(h) More stringent treatment based on other supervisory criteria

With respect to the exercise of authority by the Board under regulations comparable to section 1831g(g) of this title—

(1) the Board may not reclassify an insured credit union into a lower net worth category, or treat an insured credit union as if it were in a lower net worth category, for reasons not pertaining to the safety and soundness of that credit union; and

(2) the Board may not delegate its authority to reclassify an insured credit union into a lower net worth category or to treat an insured credit union as if it were in a lower net worth category.” (Emphasis added.)

A broad interpretation of the statute would allow for NCUA to use issues of safety and soundness to reclassify an insured credit union or treat it as though it were in a lower net-worth category. By doing so, the NCUA Board could subject those individual credit unions that did not meet the individual minimum capital requirements to the same restrictions as those credit unions that are less than well capitalized. The statute, if read broadly, could allow for the NCUA Board to downgrade a credit union in cases pertaining to safety and soundness.

Taking a more narrow interpretation of the statute, one could argue that having the authority to treat an insured credit union as if it were in a lower net worth category is not the same as having the authority to arbitrarily subject individual credit unions to different individual minimum capital requirements. While the effects of lowering a credit union’s net worth category could be similar for a credit union under the proposed individual minimum capital requirement, it is not the same as being authorized to be able to pick the point at which a credit union would not be safe and sound.

Finally, a strict reading of the statute would not provide the authority necessary for the NCUA Board to promulgate a rule that includes proposed § 702.105. Nowhere in the statute does Congress specifically authorize the NCUA Board to provide different minimum capital requirements for individual credit unions.

There is a second major issue regarding individual minimum capital requirements. Assuming the NCUA Board is deemed to have the authority to institute a system that would allow for individual minimum capital requirements because of its interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1790d(h)(1), at issue is whether the NCUA Board can delegate that authority to anyone other than itself, such as an examiner or regional director. Congress was clear in its intent that this authority is not to be delegated to anyone other than the NCUA Board.

The proposed rule uses phrases such as “The decision is necessarily based, in part, on subjective judgment grounded in agency expertise...” and “NCUA may establish

16 Prompt Corrective Action - Risk-Based Capital, 79 Fed. Reg. 11184, 11217 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 702.105(c)).
increased individual minimum capital requirements..." The proposed § 702.105 uses the term NCUA, not NCUA Board, as is used in other parts of the proposed rule. The proposed rule also specifically sets out in the summary that the initials "NCUA" are meant to mean the National Credit Union Administration as a whole agency and "Board" to mean the NCUA Board. NAFCU believes this proposed rule intends to delegate the power to raise individual minimum capital requirements from the NCUA Board to other individuals or departments within the NCUA. This would fall directly outside the power authorized by Congress in 12 U.S.C. § 1790d. These discrepancies must be addressed in any final rule that is issued.

**Definition of Complex**

The proposed rule seeks to establish new more stringent risk-based capital standards for all credit unions with more than $50 million in assets, which NCUA has defined as "complex." NCUA's re-definition of a "complex" credit union is outside of the scope of the authority designated to it by Congress. The proposed rule arbitrarily sets the threshold at $50 million in assets with no additional tests to actually determine if the credit union itself is "complex."

The FCU Act directs NCUA to develop a risk-based net worth system for complex credit unions that is based on the "portfolios of assets and liabilities of credit unions." Congress could have directed NCUA to focus only on asset size in defining "complex." Instead, the FCU Act requires NCUA to consider the complexity of a credit union's book of assets such as types of investments and loans, as well as liabilities. The definition of "complex" must be based on whether the credit union's financial activities and operations are sufficiently elaborate to warrant that credit union be designated as "complex" rather than just on its asset size.

As NAFCU has previously stated, the size of an institution does not determine the complexity of the assets and liabilities of a given credit union. There are many credit unions with well over $50 million in assets that are run out of one branch with only a handful of employees that often engage in only the most basic of transactions for members. Furthermore, there are many large credit unions that have very simple portfolios and are not involved in "risky" activities. There are also some smaller credit unions that engage in more risky activities that would require them to hold more capital. Limiting the definition of "complex" for credit unions to only those credit unions over $50 million is completely arbitrary and contrary to Congressional mandate.

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17 Prompt Corrective Action - Risk-Based Capital, 79 Fed. Reg. 11184, 11216 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 702.105(b)).
21 Id.
22 As modified by The Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 (CUMAA).
**Legislative Solution**

NAFCU supports a risk-based capital system for credit unions. We support less capital for lower-risk credit unions and more capital for higher-risk credit unions. However, we continue to believe that we need Congress to make statutory changes to the FCU Act to achieve a fair system.

Ongoing discussions with NAFCU member credit unions led to the unveiling of NAFCU’s “Five Point Plan for Regulatory Relief” in February 2013, and a call for Congress to enact meaningful legislative reforms that would provide much needed assistance to our nation’s credit unions. In NAFCU’s “Five Point Plan for Regulatory Relief,” NAFCU calls on Congress to direct NCUA and industry representatives to conduct a study by PCA and recommend changes. It also calls on Congress to modernize capital standards by directing the NCUA Board to design a risk-based capital regime for credit unions that takes into account material risks and allows the NCUA Board to authorize supplemental capital. Finally, it asks Congress to establish special capital requirements for newly chartered federal credit unions that recognizes the unique nature and challenges of starting a new credit union.

NCUA’s proposed rule on risk-based capital does not achieve a truly risk-based capital system for credit unions. NAFCU believes that the proposal is conceptually flawed, deviates from statutory requirements for PCA, and tries to establish an ill-fitting risk-based capital system without the necessary legislative solution. This results in a one-size-fits-all rule that will ultimately hurt credit unions while disregarding Congressional intent, and will require credit unions to hold additional unnecessary capital.

The FCU Act also prescribes that credit unions have net worth ratios of six percent to be considered adequately capitalized and seven percent for well capitalized, while banks have leverage ratios of four percent to be adequately capitalized and five percent for well capitalized. Credit unions are already at a competitive disadvantage to banks in this regard, and this proposed rule only serves to multiply that competitive disadvantage by requiring credit unions to hold even more capital as compared to banks.

These additional requirements are increasing the capital that credit unions cannot use to help members by providing loans. Furthermore, credit unions also have to account for a one percent contribution to the NCUSIF which constructively limits the amount of funds available for credit unions to extend credit, placing additional capital burdens on credit unions. NAFCU believes that NCUA should work with Congress to change PCA requirements such that credit unions are put on equal footing with and better able to compete with banks.

Should NCUA’s current proposed rule go forward with little or no changes, the new rule would precipitate the need for other Congressional action to bring about capital changes for credit unions such as H.R. 719, the Capital Access for Small Businesses and Jobs Act,

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which would allow credit unions to have access to supplemental capital sources. Additionally, the inclusion of an individual minimum capital requirement that starts with the examiner in any final rule only reinforces the need for action on H.R. 1553, the Financial Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act.

**The Regulatory Process**

Capital touches every part of a credit union’s operations and decision-making. NAFCU believes that this proposed rule is one of the most important rulemakings to come out of the Agency in recent history. It is troubling that NCUA has refused to work with credit unions throughout the rulemaking process.

On May 8, 2013, NAFCU sent a letter to the NCUA Board requesting it to consider creating a working group on reforming current regulatory capital requirements for credit unions. That request specifically sought a working group made up of industry stakeholders to be formed and convened prior to any rulemaking by NCUA. NAFCU continued to stress to NCUA the need for a capital working group to perform an analysis prior to the issuance of a proposed rule on risk-based capital. Unfortunately, a working group was not convened prior to the release of this proposed rule.

Furthermore, NAFCU believes that for complex and important rules it is appropriate to issue an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to collect public input on key issues. NCUA did not issue an ANPR prior to the release of the risk-based capital proposed rule. A risk-based capital rule is one such issue that is complex and important enough that an ANPR made sense for both the Agency and the credit union industry. It would also have given NCUA an opportunity to gather data from credit unions about the true effects of any changes in the capital regime. NAFCU believes that NCUA should have issued an ANPR to solicit comments from the public instead of releasing a proposed rule without credit union input either by formal comment period or working group.

Additionally, NCUA released a “Risk-Based Capital Calculator” when the NCUA Board approved the proposed rule in January 2014, and made this calculator available to the public. The calculator uses the most recent 5300 Call Report data and generates a credit union’s current net worth ratio, net worth classification, and most importantly what the credit union’s risk-based capital ratio would be pursuant to the proposed rule.

NAFCU believes that this calculator should not have been made available to the public. While this may be a useful tool for a credit union to understand what its capital position would be under the proposed rule, its public disclosure could have unintended consequences such as damage to a credit union’s reputation. The proposed rule is complex and an uninformed viewer of this information could draw the wrong conclusions about the strength of the credit union, particularly as the rule is still in the proposal stage and subject to change. A better alternative would have been to provide credit unions with access to the calculator through a secure portal on NCUA’s website.

On February 28, 2014, NAFCU sent a joint letter along with the Credit Union National Association (CUNA) to Chairman Matz to request an extension of the comment period by
90 days to give credit unions more time to understand this complex rule and to provide valuable feedback to NCUA about the possible effects of the rule on their credit union. Chairman Matz denied this request and in doing so, stated that the comment period provided enough time for credit unions to understand the rule and provide constructive comments to the Agency.

After Chairman Matz denied the request, credit unions continued to ask for more time and NAFCU, along with CUNA, wrote another letter to all members of the NCUA Board to again request that the comment period for the rule be extended for 90 days. That request was also denied. This rule is too important to rush the rulemaking process. Giving credit unions extra time to realize the full effects of the rule on present and future portfolios and business decisions easily outweighs any possible negatives in delaying its implementation.

Given the recent comments from NCUA Board members regarding the significant changes that will be made to the rule before it is finalized, NAFCU believes that NCUA should re-issue the proposed rule with any changes made using the input received from this comment period and the scheduled listening sessions through a notice of proposed rulemaking. This would give credit unions an opportunity to see those significant changes and contribute comments. If NCUA intends the final rule to include as many changes as the NCUA Board members have indicated, then NCUA will need to re-issue a proposed rule with another public comment period as required by the Administrative Procedure Act.

**Affected Credit Unions**

NCUA has stated publicly that this proposed rule would only affect around 200 credit unions.\(^{25}\) That number simply includes those credit unions whose net worth classification will be downgraded. While there may only be around 200 credit unions whose net worth categories will be downgraded, there are many more credit unions that will be affected by this proposed rule. There are 1,404 federally-insured credit unions (FICUs)\(^{26}\) that currently have more than $50 million in assets but are not currently defined as complex pursuant to PCA requirements. These credit unions would be defined as complex by the proposed rule. This means that 1,404 additional FICUs would be subject to a risk-based capital standard that would otherwise not be affected, based solely on the change in definition of “complex.” All credit unions subject to the requirements of this proposed rule will need to carefully examine their balance sheets and potentially make substantial portfolio changes.

A survey of NAFCU’s membership taken in April 2014 found that nearly 60 percent of respondents believe the proposed rule would force their credit union to hold more capital, while nearly 65 percent believe this proposal would force them to realign their balance sheet. If the NCUA implements this rule as proposed, most credit unions will have to hold more capital. This additional capital requirement is not commensurate with the actual risks

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\(^{26}\) As of December 31, 2013, there are 2,222 FICUs with assets over $50 million. 818 FICU’s have a risk-based net worth over 6% and are currently rated as complex, 1,404 FICU’s have a risk-based net worth less than or equal to 6% and are therefore not considered complex by the current definition, but would be under the proposed rule.
of a credit union’s portfolio, nor will it serve the intended purpose of protecting the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF).

NAFCU’s Economics and Research department prepared the impact analysis graphs found below that outline the impact the proposal would have on credit unions based on asset size. Our analysis of the proposed rule determined that credit unions with more than $50 million in assets will have to hold $7.1 billion more in additional reserves to achieve the same currently maintained capital cushion. Because credit unions cannot raise capital from the open market like other financial institutions, this cost will undoubtedly be passed on to the 97 million credit union members across the country in the form of higher loan rates and lower rates on share accounts.

Credit Unions Downgraded in RBNW Proposal

![Credit Unions Downgraded in RBNW Proposal](chart)

Capital cushion by asset class

Difference between actual and threshold required to be well capitalized

![Capital cushion by asset class](chart)
NAFCU questions whether it is appropriate to finalize a rule that would require credit unions to hold so much more capital as compared with the actual costs to the NCUSIF. Below is a chart that details the number of, and cost to, the NCUSIF of liquidated or assisted merger credit unions by asset class and year for credit unions under $250 million in assets. The total cost to the share insurance fund for all credit unions between $50 million and $250 million in assets from 2003 through 2012 was less than $285 million. This stands out as disproportionate when compared to the $898 million more in additional capital that would be required under the proposed rule for credit unions between $50 million and $250 million in assets to maintain the same capital cushion as in the current rule. Essentially, credit unions would be required to hold $898 million more in capital to maintain the same capital cushion as currently held in order to prevent what was less than $285 million in losses over the past 10 years.
The Number of and Cost to Insurance Fund of Liquidated or Assisted Merger Credit Unions by Asset Class and Year

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Source: NCUA FOIA response 13-FOI-00097

Between the years 2003-2012 there were 190 total credit union failures, but only 7 of these failures were credit unions above $250 million in assets. During this time period, the total number of credit unions under $250 million in assets that failed was 183. However, 160 of those failed credit unions were under $50 million in assets. There were only 23 failed credit unions between $50 million and $250 million in assets during that time period.

Additionally, almost half of the losses to the NCUSIF from 2003-2012 for those credit unions under $250 million in assets were incurred because of failures of credit unions with under $50 million in assets.

This rule will not cover those credit unions with under $50 million in assets. Meaning, if this proposed rule had been implemented prior to those failures, it would not have helped to prevent the losses to the NCUSIF. While holding additional capital for assets that do carry higher risk makes sense in a true risk-based system, holding more capital for the sake of holding more capital is not the solution, and will not prevent failures.

10.5% Risk-Based Capital Ratio

The proposed rule introduces a 10.5 percent risk-based capital ratio requirement in order for a credit union to be categorized as well capitalized. This ratio will make credit unions less competitive than their banking counterparts. NCUA reasons that the proposed “10.5 percent risk-based capital ratio target is comparable to the [o]ther [f]ederal [b]anking [r]egulatory [a]gencies’ 8 percent plus the 2.5 percent capital conservation buffer…”27 The Agency states this was done in order to “avoid the complexity of implementing a capital

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conservation buffer.\textsuperscript{28} In its efforts to avoid complexity, NCUA is proposing an ill-fitting risk-based capital ratio for credit unions.

The impact of the 2.5 percent capital conservation buffer was designed specifically for banks and does not work for credit unions, and will result in an unnecessary additional increase to credit union capital requirements. The banking regulators developed the capital conservation buffer in order to ensure that banks retained capital in times when it was needed most. During the crisis, distressed banks were distributing capital to shareholders and employees even though it was negatively affecting their capital ratios. This led the banking regulators to include a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent on top of the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio minimum level of 8 percent as part of the FDIC rules that become effective over the next five years.

The specific purpose of the capital conservation buffer is to ensure that banks are only able to pay stock dividends and share buybacks if they meet their 2.5 percent capital conservation buffer and not just the 8 percent Tier 1 risk-based capital minimum. This approach to capital distribution does fit the credit union business model.

NCUA failed to include any rationale or data for why it chose to have a 10.5 percent minimum capital requirement to be well capitalized other than to “avoid the complexity of implementing a capital conservation buffer.”\textsuperscript{29} NAFCU believes that the FDIC Tier 1 ratios are more consistent to the types of capital that credit unions are allowed to hold, as opposed to the FDIC’s other risk-based capital ratios, as indicated in the chart below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net Worth Classification</th>
<th>Proposed Risk-Based Capital Ratio</th>
<th>FDIC Tier 1 Capital Requirements</th>
<th>NAFCU’s Alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well Capitalized</td>
<td>10.5% or above</td>
<td>8% or above</td>
<td>8% or above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequately Capitalized</td>
<td>8% to 10.49%</td>
<td>6% to 7.99%</td>
<td>6% to 7.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undercapitalized</td>
<td>Less than 8%</td>
<td>Under 6%</td>
<td>Under 6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NAFCU believes that unless NCUA provide compelling rationale and/or data to differ from the FDIC rule, NCUA should remove the 2.5 percent capital buffer component of the minimum risk-based capital ratios and make capital categories mirror the FDIC Tier 1 capital requirements.

\textbf{Risk Weights}

The proposed rule revises the risk-weights for many of NCUA’s current asset classifications and requires higher minimum levels of capital for credit unions that are perceived as having riskier portfolios. NAFCU and its member credit unions have identified several key areas where risk-weighting in the proposal does not accurately capture the risks associated with the asset in question. In particular, a number of the NCUA proposed risk-weights require credit unions to hold much more capital as compared with the FDIC and Basel III requirements for community banks – often without solid justification for the deviations.

\textsuperscript{28} Id.
\textsuperscript{29} Prompt Corrective Action - Risk-Based Capital, 79 Fed. Reg. 11184, 11192.
Concentration Risk and Interest Rate Risk

As discussed above, the FCU Act requires that the system of prompt corrective action that the NCUA prescribes by regulation be comparable to those that the banking regulators institute. In the many iterations of Basel and most recent rules that the FDIC has finalized, banking regulators have chosen not to incorporate interest rate risk and concentration risk into their risk-weights. However, NCUA’s proposed rule incorporates concentration risk and interest rate risk into many of its proposed risk-weights. NAFCU acknowledges that interest rate and concentration risk are risks that every credit union needs to manage and plan for, but this rule is not the way to avoid losses due to those risks in the future.

NAFCU urges NCUA to eliminate the interest rate and concentration risk components of the risk-weighting for non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans, other real estate secured loans, member business loans (MBLs), and investments. Rather, NCUA should change those risk-weights to be consistent with the risk-weighting given to those assets by the FDIC.

A risk-based capital rule is a poor tool for managing these additional risks, and simply requiring credit unions to hold more capital does not address or solve any issues that individual credit unions have when trying to manage those risks. Both Basel III and the FDIC interim final rule are constructed in such a way that authorities would employ other mechanisms to measure and control for risk other than credit risk. In order to comply with the comparability mandate of The FCU Act, NCUA should follow the other federal banking regulatory agencies in this regard.

To better control for interest rate risk, NAFCU believes that a more sensible alternative to the proposed rule would be to continue to apply industry-accepted methods as part of a competent supervision and examination process. Banking regulators have prescribed this as well and by holding credit unions to significantly different standards, NAFCU is concerned that NCUA may be running afoul of the will of Congress regarding the requirement that the rule be comparable to what banks have to follow.

This rule will also constrict capital availability that would otherwise be used for loans to members because credit unions will be required to hold more capital for interest rate and concentration risk. This is harmful to credit unions and to their members. During the financial crisis credit unions continued to lend when banks and other financial institutions pulled back. This rule would constrict the ability of credit unions to lend to members because so much more of their capital would have to be held for interest rate and

31 Id.
32 NCUA already has a number of requirements and guidance regarding interest rate risk that credit unions must comply with, such as the interest-rate risk final rule, a letter to credit unions on the subject (12-CU-05), and it is the top subject in the most recent NCUA supervisory focus (13-CU-01). Instead of making credit unions hold more capital, NCUA should first look to its existing requirements and regulations.
concentration risk. This is another reason this rule puts credit unions at a disadvantage to banks.

**Non-Delinquent First Mortgage Real Estate Loans**

NCUA’s proposed rule uses the non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans risk-weights to compensate for concentration risk by increasing the risk-weights to correspond with the percentage of those assets held by the credit union in its portfolio. The FDIC on the other hand, does not take into consideration concentration risk through its capital standards and assigns risk-weights for non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans at 50 percent regardless of the concentration in the portfolio.

NAFCU believes that in any final rule, NCUA should set all non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loan risk-weights at 50 percent so as to align with FDIC weights as seen in the chart below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-delinquent 1st Lien Real Estate Loans</th>
<th>NCUA Proposed Risk-Weights</th>
<th>FDIC Risk-Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;25% percent of assets</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 35% of assets</td>
<td>75 percent</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;35% of assets</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The risk-weights for each asset should also be rooted in the loss histories associated with that asset. When considering whether variable weights to account for concentration risk are warranted, it makes sense to look at the loss history for different levels of concentration for a given asset. Only in the case where higher asset concentrations are shown to result in higher loss histories would there be justification for increased risk-weights. In the case of non-delinquent first lien mortgage loans, the data shows that for different concentration levels, there has been no significant difference in average charge-offs since the onset of the financial crisis. Therefore, NCUA should do away with the risk-weights associated with higher concentrations of non-delinquent first mortgage loans and simply use a single risk-weight – 50 percent – for all outstanding loans.
The graph above shows that aggregate losses for the highest concentrated credit unions (the "> 35%" group on the right) are equal to or lower than the losses for any other concentration group. NCUA argues that high concentrations of real estate and MBL loans led to numerous failures during recent years. This one-size fits all approach is not appropriate. Credit unions with high concentrations of mortgage loans on their books do not experience a higher loss rate on those loans than other credit unions, on average.

NAFCU also believes that concentration risk should be controlled through the supervision and examination process and not a one-size fits all capital regime that requires credit unions to hold more capital without allowing those credit unions with less risk to hold less capital.

The next chart shows that the capital cushion for credit unions would still shrink from current levels using FDIC risk-weights for non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans, but the impact would not be as severe as under the NCUA proposal. The FDIC weights would result in a benefit to the capital cushion for credit unions at every asset group above $100 million in assets as compared to the NCUA proposal.
The chart below uses NCUA call report data to determine the proportion of credit unions that would have been designated as "undercapitalized" prior to failure based upon NCUA's proposed rule and the FDIC risk-weights for non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans. This proportion is tracked over the twelve quarters prior to a credit union's failure. The chart indicates that there is no difference between when the NCUA or FDIC weights would have designated a credit union as "undercapitalized" prior to its failure. This is significant because it means that changing the risk-weighting to the FDIC risk-weights for other real estate loans will not detract at all from NCUA's intention that the proposed rule would act as an early warning system for troubled credit unions.
There are a number of other concerns regarding the logical inconsistencies with this one-size-fits-all capital rule. For example, the proposed rule’s treatment of real estate presents issues where a credit union may take steps to remove credit and liquidity risk from its portfolio by selling a 30-year mortgage that is currently risk-weighted at 50 percent. If that same credit union were to sell these mortgages to Fannie Mae and take back a Fannie Mae security with an average life of seven years, that mortgage-backed security would be risk-weighted at 150 percent. By doing so, the credit union has minimized its liquidity and credit risk while not providing any more interest rate risk. The result is that the credit union will be required to hold three times as much capital while having a less risky asset. This represents just one of many examples of the proposed risk-weights in this rule that do not match the actual risks posed to the credit union.

*Other Real Estate Loans*

According to the proposed rule, “real estate-secured loans not meeting the definition of first mortgage real estate loans would be referred to as ‘other real estate loans’.” In the proposed rule, the risk-weights for these other real estate loans would incorporate concentration risk and increase as the percentage of these assets held by the credit union in its portfolio increases. The FDIC weights for these types of loans are 100 percent regardless of concentration.

NAFCU believes that in any final rule, NCUA should align other real estate loans risk-weights with FDIC weights as seen in the next table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Real Estate Loans</th>
<th>NCUA Proposed Risk-Weights</th>
<th>FDIC Risk-Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-10% percent of assets</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10 to 20% of assets</td>
<td>125 percent</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20% of assets</td>
<td>150 percent</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next chart shows that the capital cushion for credit unions would still shrink from current levels using the FDIC weights for other real estate loans, but the impact would not be as severe as under the NCUA proposal. The FDIC weights would result in a benefit to the capital cushion for credit unions at every asset level size except $500 million — $1 billion (no change) as compared to the proposed rule as seen in the next graph.

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The chart below uses NCUA call report data to determine the proportion of credit unions that would have been designated as "undercapitalized" prior to failure based upon NCUA’s proposed rule and the FDIC risk-weights for other real estate loans. This proportion is tracked over the twelve quarters prior to a credit union’s failure. The chart indicates that there is no difference between when the NCUA or NAFCU weights would have designated a credit union as "undercapitalized" prior to its failure. This is significant because it means that changing the risk-weighting to the FDIC risk-weights for other real estate loans will not detract at all from NCUA’s intention that the proposed rule would act as an early warning system for troubled credit unions.
Investments

The proposed rule uses the investment risk-weights to compensate for interest rate risk. This is apparent in the differences in proposed risk-weights for investments based on the Weighted-Average Life of Investments (WAL).

NAFCU has a number of issues with the proposed rule’s risk-weights for investments. First, any final rule should eliminate the interest risk component from the capital requirements to align itself with FDIC risk-weights for investments. As noted above, credit unions already monitor and control for interest rate risk through internal policies and in accordance with NCUA examination and supervision policies. It is unnecessary and redundant for a risk-based capital regime to perform this function. This proposed rule is a one-size-fits-all requirement to hold more capital for almost all types of investments as a means to control for interest rate risk. Requiring more capital only serves as a disincentive to invest in longer-term investments, it does not provide the in-depth analysis to evaluate investments that is needed and brought about through the current supervision and examination process.  

As NAFCU compares the NCUA proposal to the FDIC requirements for risk-based capital, we note that for those investments that credit unions are permitted to make, the FDIC does not incorporate interest rate risk into the investment risk-weights for community banks. Instead, it generally weights the investments that credit unions can make with a single risk-weight regardless of maturity. FDIC weights most types of investments that credit unions are able to make at a 20 percent risk-weight regardless of the WAL. This is another example of how this rule would put credit unions at a competitive disadvantage to banks. NCUA’s proposal also does not account for any mitigation efforts, such as variable-rate assets or derivatives, which would offset some exposure for credit unions to interest rate risk.

According to the proposed rule, the specific risk-weights are based primarily upon the 300 basis point interest rate shock used to prepare for a worst-case scenario of interest rate fluctuation. This means the NCUA has selected the increments for the investment weight scale to match the loss that would take place due to a 300 basis point interest rate shock. NAFCU believes that this methodology is flawed and does not result in the appropriate risk-weights for investments.

NAFCU strongly believes that NCUA should stay within their statutorily mandate and use the 20 percent FDIC risk-weights for investments regardless of WAL, as illustrated in the next chart.

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34 NCUA already has a number of requirements and guidance that credit unions must comply with such as the interest-rate risk final rule, a letter to credit unions on the subject (12-CU-05), and it is the top subject in the most recent NCUA supervisory focus (13-CU-01). Instead of making credit unions hold more capital, NCUA should first look to its existing requirements and regulations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investments By WAL</th>
<th>NCUA Proposed Risk-Weights</th>
<th>FDIC Risk-Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1 year</td>
<td>20 percent</td>
<td>20 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>20 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 years</td>
<td>75 percent</td>
<td>20 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 years</td>
<td>150 percent</td>
<td>20 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10 years</td>
<td>200 percent</td>
<td>20 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NCUA should also be mindful of the cooling effects of the final rule on short- and medium-term investments. The chart below shows the distribution of total credit union investments by maturity bucket. Note that only about 13 percent of credit union investments have an average life of over five years.

The FDIC risk-weights would benefit the capital cushion for credit unions at every asset level size as compared to the proposed rule. This is illustrated in the next graph.
Changing the risk-weighting to the FDIC risk-weights does not significantly affect the warning available prior to a failure of a troubled credit union. The chart below uses NCUA call report data to determine the proportion of credit unions that would have been designated as “undercapitalized” prior to failure based upon NCUA’s proposed rule and the FDIC risk-weights. This proportion is tracked over the twelve quarters prior to a credit union’s failure, serving as an early warning sign to NCUA that capital issues were on the horizon.

As the graph on the next page shows, using the FDIC risk-weights for investments would result in negligible changes in the early warning signs for troubled credit unions as compared to the proposed rule. As illustrated, the alternative investment risk-weights deviate only slightly in the t-6 through t-3 and t-10 through t-8 timeframes prior to failure.

To summarize, NAFCU strongly urges NCUA to remove the interest rate risk component from any final rule. Interest rate risk should continue to be controlled for and monitored through the supervision and examination process, continuing to incorporate industry standard methods. Finally, NCUA should use the FDIC risk-weights of 20 percent for investments regardless of the WAL of the investment.

**Federal Reserve Deposits**

The proposed rule does not specifically identify how cash held at the Federal Reserve is to be treated. The rule does address how cash on deposit (which is normally interpreted as cash on deposit at other insured financial institutions), cash equivalents, and cash on hand are to be treated, but does not propose a specific risk-weight for cash held at the Federal Reserve. Credit unions often have balances at the Federal Reserve as a repository for excess cash or to satisfy their minimum reserve requirement.
NAFCU believes that cash held at the Federal Reserve should have a risk-weight of zero percent. A zero percent risk-weight would take into account the Federal Reserve’s unique relationship with the U.S. Government. NCUA should risk-weight all balances held at the Federal Reserve at zero percent.

**Federal Home Loan Banks**

The proposed rule also does not specifically address Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB). NAFCU believes that the proposed rule could risk-rate FHLB consolidated obligations and stock from 20 percent to 200 percent creating a distinct disadvantage when compared to other insured depository institutions and potentially restricting credit extensions to the communities served by credit unions.

NAFCU notes that the risk weighting for FHLB consolidated obligations (highly liquid and safe – generally rated AAA and track treasuries) and FHLB stock (statutorily mandated to be redeemed at par and no member has ever lost a cent on stock) are weighted at 20 percent under Basel and by the other banking regulators. NCUA should weight FHLB consolidated obligations and stock at 20 percent to be comparable to other banking regulators.

**Member Business Lending**

The proposed rule factors concentration risk into the proposed risk-weighting for MBLs by setting the risk-weights to correspond with the percent of assets in MBLs held by the credit union. As mentioned above, NAFCU believes that concentration risk should be controlled through the supervision and examination process and not a one-size-fits-all capital regime that requires credit unions to hold more capital without allowing those credit unions with less risk to hold less capital. The FDIC does not take concentration risk into consideration and risk-weights all business loans at 100 percent. NAFCU believes that NCUA should follow the FDIC and risk-weight MBLs at 100 percent regardless of the concentration of credit union’s assets in MBLs as seen in the chart below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MBL’s as % of CU Assets</th>
<th>NCUA Proposed Risk-Weights</th>
<th>FDIC Risk-Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-15% percent of assets</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;15 to 25% of assets</td>
<td>150 percent</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;25% of assets</td>
<td>200 percent</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next chart shows that the capital cushion for credit unions would still shrink from current levels using the FDIC weights for MBLs, but the impact would not be as severe as it would be under the NCUA proposal. The FDIC weights would result in a benefit to the capital cushion for credit unions at every asset level size above $250 million as compared to the proposed rule as seen in the next graph.
The next chart uses NCUA call report data to determine the proportion of credit unions that would have been designated as "undercapitalized" prior to failure based upon NCUA's proposed rule and the FDIC risk-weights for MBLs. This proportion is tracked over the twelve quarters prior to a credit union's failure. The chart indicates that there is very little difference between when the NCUA or FDIC weights would have designated a credit union as "undercapitalized" prior to its failure. This is significant because it means that changing the risk-weighting to the FDIC risk-weights for MBLs will only slightly change the early warning system indications for troubled credit unions as compared with NCUA's proposed rule.

Furthermore, there are a number of credit unions chartered historically for business-loan purposes that will be significantly hurt by this proposed rule. The risks to the portfolios of these special credit unions, including concentration risk, should be managed through the examination and supervision process, not through these capital risk-weights. NAFCU
believes that credit unions with proven minimal losses in business lending should be given credit for diversified portfolios and proven underwriting standards. Additionally, the proposed risk-weights would negatively impact credit unions with the low income credit union designation (LICUs), which are not subject to the statutory MBL cap. These LICUs would have a disincentive to utilize their ability to exceed the MBL cap in order to provide business loans to their members due to the restrictive requirements to hold more capital.

The proposed rule states that “MBLs that are government guaranteed at least 75 percent, normally by the Small Business Administration (SBA) or U.S. Department of Agriculture, would receive a lower risk-weight of 20 percent under the proposed rule.”35 This 75 percent threshold does not include beneficial programs that are guaranteed at between 50 percent and 75 percent such as the SBA Express program which helps many member small businesses. NCUA should factor in all guarantees made by the SBA or U.S. Department of Agriculture when determining risk-weighting for MBLs.

Another issue that NCUA has failed to address with this proposed rule is the difference risks based on the types of MBL loans by category. For example, risk-weights could also be broken down into types of loans using call report data and given appropriate risk-weights based on actual risk for the following categories: (1) agricultural MBLs; (2) construction and development; (3) non-farm, non-residential; (4) commercial and industrial loans; and (5) unsecured business loans. At this time the call report does not collect information on write-offs for different types of MBLs, but NCUA could modify the call report to collect this information.

The Effects of Combined FDIC Weights

As shown in the sections above, NAFCU believes that NCUA should use the FDIC risk-weights for non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans, other real estate loans, investments, and MBLs rather than the NCUA’s proposed risk-weights that incorporate interest rate and concentration risk. While previous graphs show the industry wide benefits to credit unions of changing the individual risk-weights from what was proposed by the NCUA to the FDIC risk-weights, the following graphs show the combined benefit of changing the proposed risk-weights for non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans, other real estate loans, investments, and MBLs to FDIC risk-weights.

This first graph shows the number and percent of credit unions that will be downgraded by asset class as a result of changing non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans, other real estate loans, investments, and MBLs to FDIC risk-weights. 28 federally insured credit unions will be downgraded as opposed to more than 200 which would be downgraded under the proposed rule. NAFCU believes that this is a more appropriate result and represents a more balanced system.

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The next graph shows the change in capital cushion by asset class as a result of changing the individual risk-weights from what was proposed to the FDIC risk-weights for non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans, other real estate loans, investments, and MBLs. It shows a benefit to credit unions capital cushion for credit unions in every asset category as compared to the proposed rule.

The chart below uses NCUA call report data to determine the proportion of credit unions that would have been designated as “undercapitalized” prior to failure based upon NCUA’s proposed rule and the FDIC risk-weights for non-delinquent first mortgage real estate loans, other real estate loans, investments, and MBLs. This proportion is tracked over the twelve quarters prior to a credit union’s failure. The chart indicates that there is very little difference between when the NCUA or FDIC weights would have designated a credit union as “undercapitalized” prior to its failure.
Importantly, changing the risk-weighting for these assets to the FDIC risk-weights does not compromise the NCUA’s stated intent for the proposed rule to serve as an early warning system for troubled credit unions. Using the FDIC risk-weights will still accomplish this essential function of a balanced risk-based capital system. NAFCU strongly believes that NCUA should align the risk-weights for these assets with the FDIC risk-weights.

Credit Union Service Organizations (CUSOs)

The proposed rule sets a 250 percent risk-weight for investments in CUSOs and 100 percent for loans to a CUSO. In the proposed rule, NCUA does not include rationale as to why investments in CUSOs should get a proposed risk-weight of 250 percent except to say that a CUSO is an unsecured equity investment with no secondary market. Any final rule should include more detailed rationale, as well as any data used to support the final risk-weight.

The proposed rule also fails to explain the difference in proposed risk-weights between the 250 percent for investments in CUSOs and 100 percent for loans to CUSOs. This would suggest that loans to CUSOs are 2.5 times safer than investments in CUSOs, or in the reverse, that investments in CUSOs are 2.5 times riskier than a loan to a CUSO. Consumer debt that is over sixty days delinquent is currently rated at 150 percent while investments in a CUSO are rated at 250 percent.

Although there have been a couple of high-profile credit union losses partially driven by bad CUSO investments, the overwhelming majority of CUSOs are performing very well, generating considerable savings through economies of scale, and providing much needed non-interest income to the credit union owners. During a time of increased regulatory costs, shrinking fee income, and artificially depressed interest rates, it is imperative that credit unions are able to use CUSOs to decrease overhead costs while increasing business.

NCUA’s argument that CUSOs represent a safety and soundness threat to the NCUSIF is also without merit. Less than 22 basis points of credit union assets are invested in CUSOs
and do not represent a systematic risk that could take down the share insurance fund. Those same 22 basis points are less than what credit unions have paid in annual corporate assessments in 2012. Each credit union may only invest less than 1 percent of its assets into CUSOs.\(^\text{36}\) For example, suppose that in an unlikely scenario a credit union lost its entire investment in a CUSO. This loss alone would not be material and the consequences of requiring a disproportionate amount of capital, as compared with actual risk, are more far reaching as credit unions will not enjoy those cost savings made available only through the collaborative model of CUSOs.

NCUA is making policy decisions that affect business decisions for credit unions through these proposed risk-weights. This proposed rule could force credit unions to reconsider current and future investments in CUSOs. Credit unions might divest currently held investments and not invest in future CUSOs. This will hurt members and credit unions alike.

If NCUA declines to lower the risk-weighting to a reasonable level for investments in CUSOs, NCUA should at least consider differentiating between different types of CUSOs and assessing a risk-weight that accurately measures the risk of loss. Some of the possible factors to consider would be the types of services provided by a given CUSO (mortgage servicing, IT, compliance, etc.), whether the amount of investment is material, whether the CUSO has a history of profitability or loss, or whether the investment has already been recovered by the credit union through income or savings. Then NCUA could provide lower risk weights for CUSOs that present less of a risk to credit union assets.

**Mortgage Servicing Assets (MSA)**

The proposed rule would set the risk-weight at 250 percent for mortgage servicing assets (MSAs). This is an artificially high and excessive risk-weight relative to the actual risk presented by the underlying assets. The 250 percent weight is punitive and indicates a change in NCUA’s view regarding loan participations.

Last year NCUA finalized a rule on loan participations that was intended to help credit unions and NCUA better manage the potential concentration risk in loan participations. The loan participation rule is working and should be allowed to continue to do so instead of assigning artificially higher risk-weights for mortgage servicing assets.

The proposed rule does not include a mechanism for NCUA to differentiate between an asset that is sold with recourse versus one that is sold without recourse. This would change the actual risk to a credit union depending on the underlying loans in a mortgage servicing asset. This one-size fits all approach does not appropriately measure actual risk.

MSAs are fairly liquid and gain value as rates rise. These present excellent opportunities to gain income and help prevent against some forms of interest rate risk. Also, credit unions do a great job servicing loans and want to continue to serve members. Many credit unions originate loans and then sell those loans to reduce interest rate and liquidity risk, yet retain

\(^{36}\) 12 CFR 712.2(a).
the servicing due to the relationship with the member and because these are valuable assets. This arbitrary risk-weight provides a disincentive to retain those servicing rights.

NAFCU believes that NCUA should set the risk-weights for mortgage servicing assets at 150 percent. NCUA should also find a way to consider whether the loan is a recourse loan and assign those a 150 percent risk-weight. NCUA could then allow a lower weighting of 100 percent if the loans are sold without recourse but are serviced by the credit union.

**Corporates Paid-In Capital**

The proposed rule would set a risk-weight for paid-in corporate capital at 200 percent. This is one of the higher risk-weights proposed by this rule and does not appear to accurately represent the unique nature of corporate credit unions.

The corporate credit unions have had more regulatory changes over the past five years than any other sector of the credit union system including additional capital requirements. These changes include: stricter investment limits, concentration risk prohibitions, and governance changes. These prior regulatory changes to the corporate credit union system and the eliminated risks should be represented through a lower risk-weight.

The proposed risk-weight does not reflect the actual risk of this asset. The proposed rule suggests that corporate paid-in capital is two times as risky as a dollar invested in a mortgage loan in excess of 35 percent of assets. This could also serve as a disincentive to credit unions to invest in corporate credit unions and thereby endanger the current corporate credit union structure.

A weight that reflects the actual risk for paid-in capital to corporate credit unions would benefit natural person credit unions, corporate credit unions, and the share insurance fund. Paid-in capital would be more appropriately weighted at 125 percent to recognize that the corporate credit union structure is different than it once was, and now presents less risk to the credit union system. The 125 percent also recognizes that the corporates paid-in capital is riskier than safer investments such as treasuries or consumer loans.

**Individual Minimum Capital Requirements**

The proposed rule provides NCUA with the ability to require a higher minimum risk-based capital ratio for an individual credit union in any case where the Agency determines the circumstances, such as the level of risk of a particular investment portfolio, the risk management systems, or other information, indicate that a higher minimum risk-based capital requirement is appropriate. This means NCUA may establish increased individual minimum capital requirements upon its determination that the credit union’s capital is, or may become, inadequate in light of the credit union’s circumstances, regardless of the actual risk-based capital ratio of the credit union.

In other words, NCUA can increase a credit union’s individual risk-based capital requirement by subjective action through the examination process or “supervisory assessment” based on the determination that the credit union needs additional capital based
on the credit union’s balance sheet risk. A survey of NAFCU’s membership taken in April 2014 found that over 65 percent of respondents have serious concerns about this portion of the rule.

NAFCU believes there are serious concerns regarding the legal authority of NCUA to enact this portion of the rule, as discussed above.

In addition to potential legal issues, this portion of the proposal seems to undermine the stated purpose of the rule. On the one hand, credit unions are led to believe that the proposal is designed to factor in a number of different risks including interest rate and concentration risk. On the other hand, if the risk-based capital ratios laid out in the proposal do not result in the numbers NCUA examiners would like to see, NCUA can change the rules for an individual credit union. This makes it nearly impossible for a credit union to make a sound business decision concerning its portfolio makeup, leading to even more uncertainty for credit unions and credit union members.

**Individual Minimum Capital Requirement Appeals Process**

The proposed appeals process does not alleviate any of the underlying concerns with the individual minimum capital requirements portion of the rule. The process itself lays a great deal of burden on individual credit unions to prove that the NCUA action was not an appropriate exercise of discretion by the Agency. The process also requires credit unions to appeal to the same NCUA Board that, according to statute, is required to make the judgment in the first place.

While the proposed rule allows credit unions to seek the opinion of the NCUA’s Ombudsman, the NCUA Board is not bound by, or required to give deference to, the Ombudsman’s recommendations. NAFCU believes that NCUA should enact an independent appeals process free of examiner retaliation. It is important that the independent appeals process include appeals to non-interested parties that do not have an opportunity to retaliate against individual credit unions that make appeals.

**Goodwill and Other Issues**

The proposed rule fails to include a number of components to the numerator portion of the risk-based capital ratio including goodwill, other intangible assets, and identified losses not reflected as adjustments to components of the risk-based numerator.

The loss of goodwill within the risk-based capital ratio numerator presents two significant issues to consider. First, it penalizes credit unions for past actions. Goodwill is present on the balance sheets of credit unions recently involved in mergers. Without goodwill, credit unions will be unable to fully realize the benefit of merging in troubled credit unions.

Secondly, this can present significant problems in the future. The credit union industry has seen increased consolidation in the past few years and this is a trend that is likely to continue. Without goodwill as a component of the numerator, a healthy credit union is less likely to agree to take on a troubled credit union as a partner (even at the request of
NCUA). This is going to make it harder and more expensive for NCUA (and the industry as a whole) to find merger partners for troubled or failing credit unions that will ultimately lead to more expensive liquidations for the NCUSIF.

NAFCU believes that NCUA should reconsider removing goodwill from the numerator portion of the risk-based capital ratio.

**Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses**

In the capital elements of the risk-based capital ratio numerator, the proposed rule limits ALLL to 1.25 percent of risk assets. The discussion in the rule states this limitation is proposed to provide an incentive for granting quality loans and recording loan losses timely. The disregard for excess ALLL does not provide an equitable solution.

Credit unions are generally more conservative than banks when it comes to ALLL. This cap of 1.25 percent will penalize a credit union for being conservative with its allowance and provide a disincentive for holding ALLL above the 1.25 percent cap.

NAFCU encourages NCUA to consider changing the 1.25 percent cap to 1.50 percent of risk assets to provide a better incentive for fully funding ALLL above 1.25 percent. In addition, in the most recent Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) proposal on ALLL (the Current Expected Credit Loss model), issued in December 2012, if put into place, has the potential to significantly increase ALLL reserves by as much as 20-50 percent. If those changes are put into place, NCUA should increase the limit of ALLL to be included in the risk-based capital numerator comparable to the additional levels of ALLL required.

**Supplemental Capital**

Supplemental capital authority is needed now more than ever considering the restrictions brought on by this rule. NCUA should continue to call on Congress to pass a legislative solution that modernizes capital standards to allow supplemental capital.

Currently, a credit union's net worth ratio is determined solely on the basis of retained earnings as a percentage of total assets. Because retained earnings often cannot keep pace with asset growth, otherwise healthy growth — such as growth resulting from taking deposits — can dilute a credit union's regulatory capital ratio and trigger non-discretionary supervisory actions under PCA rules. Allowing eligible credit unions access to supplemental capital, in addition to retained earning sources, will help ensure that healthy credit unions can achieve manageable asset growth and continue to serve member-owners efficiently.

While supplemental capital authority is important for those credit unions that are able to raise it, it is important to understand that supplemental capital authority is not the answer to all of the problems with this proposed rule. There is a difference between the authority to raise supplemental capital and the ability of individual credit unions to actually obtain it.
Not every credit union would be able to use that important tool to actually raise significant capital even if the credit union were given the authority to do so.

**Implementation Date**

NCUA has proposed an implementation time period and effective date of 18 months after the passage of a final rule and its publication in the *Federal Register*. During that 18 months implementation period, credit unions would need to prepare balance sheets for the new risk-based capital ratio requirements, and would also be required to continue to comply with the current PCA requirements of part 702 on NCUA’s rules and regulations.

NAFCU believes that the proposed 18-month implementation timetable is not long enough for a rule as complex and impactful as this proposed rule. The proposed revisions to net-worth and capital requirements will vastly affect a credit union’s decision making and it will take time for a credit union to adjust its balance sheets related to this new regulation. Credit unions will also need to adjust internal systems and operations well in advance of the effective date.

Credit unions will be faced with difficult decisions when attempting to raise risk-based capital ratios under the proposed rule. Credit unions will have to either divest assets that are more heavily risk weighted or generate retained earnings. It is difficult to generate retained earnings in a short period of time when credit unions are being forced to divest the assets that have the largest returns and produce the most retained earnings.

When comparing NCUA’s proposed timeframe and the time frame afforded to banks during the implementation of BASEL standards, it is evident that the proposed implementation timeframe is insufficient. Given the difficulties that credit unions will face to accumulate additional capital through retained earnings, a longer time frame for the implementation of this rule is necessary.

NAFCU believes any implementation period should be no less than three years after passage of any final rule. Credit unions will need at least that long to make safe and sound decisions about potentially fundamental changes to core business decisions including investments and product offerings. This would also be more consistent with the time frame given to the banking industry during the BASEL standards implementation. On September 10, 2013, the FDIC issued a consolidated interim final rule (Basel III interim final rule) and its final rule was issued on April 14, 2014. While some portions of the rule take effect as soon as two years after the final rule, all portions of the rule do not become fully effective until January 1, 2019, almost five years after the rule was finalized.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, NAFCU is supportive of the idea of a risk-based capital regime for credit unions; however, the current NCUA proposal does not achieve the desired system and would ultimately harm credit unions. If it were to be implemented as proposed, credit unions would be at a significant competitive disadvantage to banks. As proposed, the rule is one-size-fits-all and would serve to stifle growth, innovation, and diversification at
credit unions, NAFCU hopes that the NCUA Board will ultimately withdraw the proposal and work with Congress to modernize capital standards in accordance with the recommendations in NAFCU’s “Five Point Plan for Regulatory Relief.”

Alternatively, should the NCUA Board fail to withdraw the proposal, it should remove the interest rate and concentration risk components that are currently incorporated into the risk weightings and lower the risk-weights to accurately reflect the risk associated with specific assets and to become comparable to the standards of other banking regulators. The NCUA Board should also remove the provision regarding individual capital requirements as this authority rests on questionable legal grounds and its inclusion increases uncertainty for credit unions.

Thank you for your continued commitment to listen to feedback from credit unions on this important issue. Should you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues further, please feel free to contact me or PJ Hoffman, Regulatory Affairs Counsel, at PJHoffman@nafcu.org or (703) 842-2212.

Sincerely,

B. Dan Berger
President and CEO
National Association of Federal Credit Unions

NAFCU Board of Directors:

Michael J. Parsons, Chairman
President/CEO
First Source FCU
Assets: $371,264,380

Ed Templeton, Vice Chairman
President/CEO
SRP FCU
Assets: $654,084,919

Richard L. Harris, Treasurer
President/CEO
Caltech Employees FCU
Assets: $1,253,020,681

Jeanne Kucey, Secretary
President/CEO
JetStream Federal Credit Union
Assets: $156,143,673

Martin Breland
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Tower FCU
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Rod Taylor
President/CEO
Barksdale FCU
Assets: $153,707,628
Cutter Dawson  
Chairman, NAFCU Regulatory Committee  
President/CEO  
Navy FCU  
Assets: $55,502,976,265

Michael N. Lussier  
NAFCU Regulatory Committee Member  
President/CEO  
Webster First FCU  
Assets: $646,079,823

Jan N. Roche  
President/CEO  
State Department FCU  
Assets: $1,520,520,032

Debra Schwartz  
NAFCU Regulatory Committee Member  
President/CEO  
Mission FCU  
Assets: $2,449,729,632

Daniel Weickenand  
NAFCU Regulatory Committee Member  
CEO  
Orion FCU  
Assets: $527,592,209

NAFCU Regulatory Committee Members:

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<th>Title</th>
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<td>Chief Operating Officer</td>
<td>Duke University FCU</td>
<td>$109,877,949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joe Clark</td>
<td>Chief Legal Officer</td>
<td>Truliant FCU</td>
<td>$1,667,349,920</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Farmakides</td>
<td>President/CEO</td>
<td>Lafayette FCU</td>
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<td>Mitchell Klein</td>
<td>Chief Risk Officer</td>
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<td>John Buckley</td>
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<td>Gerber FCU</td>
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<td>John Harwell</td>
<td>AVP Risk Management</td>
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<td>Jim Laffoon</td>
<td>President/CEO</td>
<td>Security Service FCU</td>
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Janet Larson  
Director  
SunState FCU  
Assets: $297,621,812

Leanne McGuinness  
SVP/CFO  
The Summit FCU  
Assets: $719,691,062

Michael Pardon  
President/CEO  
Sea Air FCU  
Assets: $146,830,582

Jane Verret  
Chief Administration  
Campus FCU  
Assets: $509,914,856

Susan Lezotte  
AVP Compliance  
Eli Lilly FCU  
Assets: $1,033,855,869

Jim Mooney  
President/CEO  
Chevron FCU  
Assets: $2,352,852,646

Wayne Schulman  
SVP, Corporate Counsel  
Logix FCU  
Assets: $3,703,062,025
Attachment B: Dover Federal Credit Union’s May 14, 2014, comment letter on the NCUA’s Prompt Corrective Action/ Risk-Based Capital proposal
May 14, 2014

Gerard Poliquin, Secretary of the Board
National Credit Union Administration
1775 Duke Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-3428

RE: Prompt Corrective Action; Risk-Based Capital, 12 CFR Parts 700, 701, 702, 703, 713, 723 and 747

Dear Mr. Poliquin:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed Prompt Corrective Action; Risk Based Capital Regulation.

Dover Federal Credit Union (Dover Federal, Credit Union) was formed to serve the men and women on Dover Air Force Base, both active duty and civilians in 1958. Over the years, the field of membership has expanded to over 300 select groups. Currently, Dover Federal serves 39,403 members and has $403 million in assets.

While there is no doubt that the current capital regulations need to be updated, I believe that the National Credit Union Association has reacted overly aggressively to past financial conditions and as a result created a regulation that places credit unions at a disadvantage in the financial services industry. Additionally, there has not been sufficient evidence or losses to prove a need to replace the current leverage ratio methodology with a risk based methodology.

**Complex Credit Union**

Under current §702.103 of NCUA’s regulations, a credit union is defined as “complex” if “[i]ts quarter-end total assets exceed fifty million dollars ($50,000,000); and . . . [i]ts [RBNW] requirement, as calculated under § 702.106, exceeds six percent (6%).” Current § 702.104 of NCUA’s regulations defines eight risk portfolios of complex credit union assets, liabilities, or contingent liabilities. The proposal defines a credit union as complex if its assets exceed $50 million, regardless of the composition of their balance sheet. This arbitrary level is extremely low in today’s financial services industry and significantly lower than the threshold established for banks and bank holding companies of $1.5 billion, contingent upon their business practices and balance sheet composition. There are probably a significant number of credit unions in the $50 million to $500 million asset range that are not complex by today’s qualifiers. Arbitrarily classifying them as complex based upon their asset size does not strengthened the credit union industry or protect the insurance fund. In fact, doing so will probably have the opposite impact.

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Capital Requirements Significantly Higher Than Banks

NCUA states in the proposal that "The proposed revisions would include a new method for computing NCUA's risk-based capital measure that is more consistent with the risk-based capital measure for corporate credit unions and the risk-based capital measures used by the Other Federal Banking Regulatory Agencies." and "In general, credit unions have high quality capital, with retained earnings being the predominant form of capital." In fact the proposed risk ratings are much higher than those required by Other Federal Banking Regulatory Agencies.

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<tr>
<th>Investment Risk Weights</th>
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<td>Maturities of 0 to 1 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maturities of 1 to 3 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maturities of 3 to 5 years</td>
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<td>Maturities of 5 to 10 years</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total book balances &lt;25% of assets</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Book balance in excess of 25% and less than 35% of assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Book balances in excess of 35% of assets</td>
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<th>Other and Delinquent Real Estate Risk Weights</th>
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<td>Total book balances &lt;10% of assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Book balance in excess of 10% of assets and less than 20% of assets</td>
<td>125%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>Book balances in excess of 20% of assets</td>
<td>150%</td>
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<tr>
<th>Business Loans</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total book balances &lt;15% of assets</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book balance in excess of 15% of assets and less than 25% of assets</td>
<td>150%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book balances in excess of 25% of assets</td>
<td>200%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Delinquent loans - NCUA’s proposal and Basel III both use a risk weight of 150% for delinquent loans. However, a loan at a bank is not classified as delinquent until it is more than 90 days past due while NCUA considers a loan past due at 60 days.

The above recommended risk weights are contrary to the purpose NCUA stated in the Federal Register. Furthermore, it is hard to envision why risk weights for credit unions need to be greater than their banking counterparts considering the overall performance of the credit union industry over the past five years compared to the banking industry. However, what is truly ironic is that during the FDIC’s April 8, 2014, board meeting, the Bank Insurance Fund approved a new rule to strengthen the leverage capital requirements for the eight largest, most systematically important banking organizations. The new rule requires a 6% leverage ratio for the insured banks to be considered well-capitalized under prompt corrective action. Bank holding companies would need to have a leverage ratio of 5%. By comparison, the Basel framework requires only a 3% minimum leverage ratio for both levels of a banking organization. During the meeting, FDIC chairman Martin J. Gruenberg said the leverage approach “benefits the financial system as a whole and reduces the potential systemic risk these institutions pose.” He supported the cooperative model’s capital standard saying: “This is a rule of significant consequence. In my view, this final rule may be the most significant step we have taken to reduce the systemic risk posed by these large complex banking organizations.” In a more extensive statement, FDIC vice chairman Thomas M. Hoenig laid out the benefits of a leverage ratio versus the traditional risk-based approach: “The supplementary leverage ratio is a more reliable measure that is simple to calculate, understand, and enforce than the subjective risk-weighted measures, and it provides a highly useful initial assessment of a bank's balance sheet strength...Experience has shown that relying only on a risk-based capital measure serves the public poorly... As recently as year-end 2013, reported risk-based capital ratios for the largest global banks averaged 13% while the average leverage ratio was less than 5%... I am confident that supervisors will rely increasingly on the leverage ratio, as the market already does, to judge a firm’s capital levels, loss absorbing capacity, and balance sheet strength”. A third FDIC board member, Jeremiah O. Norton, supported the rule with the following points: “There is recent economic research to support the conclusion that the leverage ratio is a statistically significant predictor of bank default while the Basel Tier I risk-based capital ratio is not.”

If NCUA wishes to be more closely aligned with the Other Federal Banking Regulatory Agencies why is there an emphasis on risk based capital versus when the FDIC is moving from such standards?

Individual Minimum Capital Requirement

The proposed rule provides NCUA the ability to require a higher minimum risk-based capital ratio for an individual credit union in any case where NCUA determines that the credit union’s capital is or may become inadequate in light of the credit union’s circumstances regardless of the actual risk based capital ratio of the credit union. In addition to the questionable legality of this section, this portion of the regulation challenges the entire purpose of the rule. The proposed regulation and risk weights are being established to ensure that credit unions are adequately capitalized to be prepared for a number of risks including concentration risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and liquidity risk. However, if NCUA decides that their risk-based capital ratios are inadequate, the NCUA can create new standards for an individual credit union. In reality, doesn’t NCUA already have this power through their corrective action procedures and the use of documents of resolution (DOR) or cease and desist orders?


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CUSOs

The proposal would set the risk-weight at 250 percent for investments in CUSOs and 100 percent for loans to CUSOs. However reasoning for the differences is not provided. Less than 22 basis points of credit union assets are invested in CUSOs. Therefore, there does not appear to be systematic risk that threatens the share insurance fund. However, this proposed rule could force credit unions to amend and/or reconsider their business plans. Risks of this nature should be managed through the examination and supervision process and not by a one size fits all approach.

Implementation Period

The proposed 18 month implementation timetable is insufficient for a rule with such broad impacts on all operations of credit unions. Furthermore, it fails to meet NCUA's stated purpose of becoming more closely aligned with the Other Federal Banking Regulatory Agencies as banks were given a three year period to prepare for the implementation of the BASEL standards.

I trust that the NCUA Board will review all of the submitted comments to create an improved capital regulation that protects the credit union industry and the share insurance fund without placing arbitrary undue hardships on credit unions that will prevent us from providing the products and services that our members want and need.

Sincerely,

David W. Clendeniel
President/CEO
Attachment C: NAFCU’s “Five Point Plan for Regulatory Relief” released in February 2013
Learn How NAFCU’s Five-Point Plan Will Bring Regulatory Relief to Credit Unions

In February 2013, NAFCU was the first trade association to call on this Congress to provide comprehensive broad-based regulatory relief for credit unions. As part of this effort, NAFCU sent Congress a five-point plan for regulatory relief that will significantly enhance credit unions’ ability to create jobs, help the middle class, and boost our nation’s struggling economy. The five-point plan is built on a solid framework of recommendations that provide regulatory relief through the following:

1. Administrative Improvements for the Powers of the NCUA
   - Allow a federal credit union to petition NCUA for a waiver of a federal rule in favor of a state rule.
   - Provide NCUA the authority to delay implementation of CFPB rules that affect credit unions and to tailor those rules for credit unions’ unique structure.
   - Require a cost/benefit analysis of all rules that includes a three-year look back and reevaluation of rules that cost 20 percent or more than their original cost estimate.
   - Enact new examination fairness provisions to help ensure timeliness, clear guidance and an independent appeal process free of examiner retaliation.
   - Improve the Central Liquidity Facility by removing the subscription requirement for membership and permanently removing the borrowing cap.

2. Capital Reforms for Credit Unions
   - Direct NCUA and industry representatives to conduct a study on prompt corrective action and recommend changes.
   - Modernize capital standards by directing the NCUA Board to design a risk-based capital regime for credit unions that takes into account material risks and allows the NCUA Board to authorize supplemental capital.
   - Establish special capital requirements for newly chartered federal credit unions that recognize the unique nature and challenges of starting a new credit union.

3. Structural Improvements for Credit Unions
   - Direct NCUA, with industry input, to conduct a study of outdated corporate governance provisions in the Federal Credit Union Act and make recommended changes to Congress.
   - Improve the process for expanding a federal credit union’s field of membership by allowing voluntary mergers among multiple common bond credit unions, easing the community charter conversion process and making it easier to include those designated as “underserved” within a credit union’s field of membership.
4. Operational Improvements for Credit Unions

› Raise the arbitrary cap on member business loans to 27.5% or raise the exemption on MBL loans from $50,000 to $250,000, adjusted for inflation, and exempt loans made to non-profit religious organizations, businesses with fewer than 20 employees and businesses in “underserved areas.”

› Remove requirements to mail redundant and unnecessary privacy notices on an annual basis, if the policy has not changed and new sharing has not begun since the last distribution of the notice.

› Allow credit unions greater authority and flexibility in how they invest.

› Provide NCUA the authority to establish longer maturities for certain credit union loans and greater flexibility in responding to market conditions.

› Provide federal share insurance coverage for Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs).

5. 21st Century Data Security Standards

› Establish national standards for safekeeping of all financial information.

› Establish enforcement standards for data security that prohibit merchants from retaining financial data, and require merchants to disclose their data security policies to customers.

› Hold merchants accountable for the costs of a data breach, especially when it was due to their own negligence; shift the burden of proof in data breach cases to the party that incurred a breach and require timely disclosures in the event of a breach.

For more information, visit www.nafcu.org/regrelief.
Attachment D: NAFCU’s “Dirty Dozen” – Twelve Regulations to Eliminate or Amend
NAFCU's "Dirty Dozen" - Twelve Regulations to Eliminate or Amend

1. Expand credit union investment authority to include permissible investments in derivatives, securitization and mortgage servicing rights. NAFCU strongly pushed for the expansion of credit unions' investment authority to include the ability to engage in limited derivatives activities. NAFCU will continue to seek this authority for qualified credit unions. In addition, NAFCU will push for the authority to securitize loans and expanded ability to invest in mortgage servicing rights.

2. Seek updates and modernization of the NCUA's fixed assets rule. In particular, the NCUA should: (1) increase the current 5 percent aggregate limit; (2) re-define what constitutes "fixed assets"; and, (3) improve the process of obtaining a waiver.

3. Improve the process for credit unions seeking changes to their field of membership. Improvements should include: (1) enabling credit unions to strengthen their associational membership charter; (2) streamlining the process for converting from one charter type to another; (3) remove or greatly increase the current population limits for serving members in a metropolitan area (1 million) and contiguous political jurisdictions (500,000); and, (4) making it easier for all credit unions to add "underserved" areas within their field of membership.

4. Increase the number of transfers allowed to be made per month from savings accounts. The restriction on "convenience transfers" under Regulation D presents an ongoing concern for NAFCU and its members. Members are often unable to understand and remember the arbitrary limits on the number and types of transfers the regulations permit them to make from their savings account. Members expect to have the ability to transfer their funds with ease to and from particular accounts, and the regulation's six-transfer limitation from savings accounts creates an undue burden for both members and credit unions. This six-transfer limitation should be updated and increased to at least nine transfers per month, while still making a distinction between savings and transaction accounts.

5. Seek added flexibility for credit unions that offer member business loans. These improvements could include: (1) securing credit union-friendly changes to the waiver process; (2) increasing the general minimum loan-to-value ratio from 80% to 85%; and, (3) securing removal of the 5 year relationship requirement.

6. Update the requirement to disclose account numbers to protect the privacy of members. Credit unions are currently required to list a member's full account number on every periodic statement sent to the member for their share accounts pursuant to Regulation E. These requirements need to be updated to allow the credit union to truncate account numbers on periodic statements in order to protect the privacy of the member and to reduce the risks of fraud and identity theft.

7. Update advertising requirements for loan products and share accounts. The regulatory requirements for advertisement of credit unions' loan products and share accounts have not kept pace with technological changes in the current market place. The requirements of Regulation Z and Truth in Savings should be updated to reflect these changes and advances in practical advertisements and the disbursement of information, while maintaining the integrity and accuracy of the information that the member truly needs to know from the advertisement.

8. Modernize NCUA advertising requirements to keep up with technological changes and an increasingly mobile membership. Update NCUA regulations to clarify that the official sign is not required to be displayed on (1) mobile applications, (2) social media, and (3) virtual tellers.
9. Seek improvements to the Central Liquidity Facility by reducing the amount of time that it takes for a credit union to secure access to liquidity. In addition, work with the NCUA to secure changes the Central Liquidity Facility by removing the subscription requirement for membership and permanently removing the borrowing cap.

10. Obtain flexibility for federal credit unions to determine their choice of law. Federal credit unions should be allowed the opportunity to choose the jurisdiction under which they operate without surrendering their federal charter. To this end, NAFCU will work with the NCUA to establish a waiver process under which a federal credit union, taking into account safety and soundness considerations, would choose the state law under which it wants one or more of its operations.

11. Update, simplify and make improvements to regulations governing check processing and funds availability. These enhancements should include: changing outdated references (i.e., references to non-local checks); changes that are required by statute and are already effective and incorrectly stated in the regulation; and changes that enable credit unions to address fraud.

12. Eliminate redundant NCUA requirements to provide copies of appraisals upon request. Credit unions are required to provide copies of appraisals under the CFPB’s final mortgage rules upon receipt of an application for certain mortgages. The NCUA’s requirements to provide a copy upon request should be amended to remove this duplicative requirement.